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F YOU ARE DYING OF STARVATION, you have stronger reason to 
eat something nourishing than to see to it that your desk is well stocked 
with paper clips. We could express the same truth by saying that your 
reasons to eat something nourishing outweigh, or are weightier than, your rea-
sons to stock your desk with paper clips. But the notions of normative 
strength and weight1 are metaphors for some underlying normative reality. 
Any plausible theory of reasons and their strengths will need to cash out the-
se metaphors. In Being Realistic about Reasons (2014), T. M. Scanlon offers a 
novel theory of normative strength. On Scanlon’s view, a fact p is a reason to 
perform an action or take some attitude a when the relation R(p, x, c, a) holds 
between a fact, an agent, a circumstance, and an action or attitude. The 
strength of a reason is determined by facts about whether p is a sufficient reason 
for x to a in either an actual or a counterfactual circumstance c. I argue that 
Scanlon’s attempts to cash out the metaphor of normative strength by ap-
pealing to counterfactuals lead to deep problems for his view. 
 
1. Scanlon’s Theory of Strength 
 
Some reasons outweigh others. Scanlon analyzes this outweighing relation in 
terms of the relation SR(p, x, c, a), which holds just in case a fact p is a suffi-
cient reason for x to do a in circumstances c. When the SR(p, x, c, a) relation 
holds, an agent who does a in c is not open to rational criticism for taking p 
to be a sufficient reason to do a (Scanlon 2014: 106). Scanlon understands 
the outweighing relation as follows: 
 
One consideration, q, outweighs another p, if the following hold: R(p, x, c, a), R(q, 
x, c, b), where b is a course of action incompatible with a, and SR(q, x, c, b) but not 
SR(p, x, c, a), although SR(p, x, c’, a) where c’ is a set of circumstances as normative-
ly similar to c as possible except that q does not obtain in c’ (108). 
 
In other words, one reason r outweighs another r’ if r is a sufficient reason to 
Φ, but r’ is not a sufficient reason to Ψ, where Φ-ing and Ψ-ing are in-
compatible, but r’ would have been a sufficient reason to Ψ if the circum-
stances were normatively very similar but r did not obtain. 
Notice that Scanlon’s characterization of the outweighing relation seems 
to rule out the possibility that there are facts about the relative weights of 
reasons for compatible actions. This is because the outweighing relation, as 
Scanlon sketches it, holds only between reasons for incompatible actions. Yet it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I will use “strength” and “weight” interchangeably. 
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seems clear that there are often facts about the relative strengths of reasons 
for different, but compatible, actions. Consider, for example, the strengths of 
my reasons in these two cases: 
 
Bread Run: I am at the grocery store shopping for bread. There are two loaves 
left: B1 and B2. B1 expires in three days. B2 expires in seven days. My 
circumstances are such (let us say) that I have conclusive reason to 
grab B2. 
 
Blue Button: If I do not push the blue button, everyone in Canada will die imme-
diately. My circumstances are such that I have conclusive reason to 
push the blue button. 
 
The actions described in these cases are compatible, since it is possible for an 
agent to grab B2 while in the grocery store and push the blue button when 
she is in a position to do so. Scanlon’s account of outweighing seems to have 
nothing to say about the relative weights of my reasons in these cases. Never-
theless, it seems clear that the question, “Which reason is stronger: my reason 
to grab B2 or my reason to push the blue button?” is both intelligible and has 
a determinate answer. My reason to push the blue button is (much) stronger.  
But Scanlon has a reply. He can explain the relative weights of my rea-
sons in Bread Run and Blue Button by imagining a counterfactual scenario in 
which I can either push the blue button or grab B2, but I cannot do both. In 
such a scenario, I would have sufficient reason to push the blue button, but I 
would not have sufficient reason to grab B2. On Scanlon’s view, the truth of 
this counterfactual makes it the case that my reason to push the blue button 
is stronger than my reason to grab B2.2 
Scanlon’s strategy for answering questions about the relative weights of 
reasons for two different but compatible actions, then, is to imagine counter-
factual scenarios in which the two actions in question are incompatible. In oth-
er words, we should imagine scenarios in which the agent can act on one rea-
son or the other, but not both. We then ask: On which reason does the agent 
have sufficient reason to act? The correct answer to this question determines 
which reason is stronger. Such a strategy seems to deliver the correct verdict 
when it comes to the relative strengths of my reasons in Bread Run and Blue 
Button. And Scanlon expects that similar appeals to counterfactuals will ac-
count for most of our intuitive judgments about the relative strengths of rea-
sons across a wide range of other cases. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Though Scanlon does not consider this exact difficulty in his book, he has suggested to me 
in conversation that this is how he would like to account for strength comparisons between 
two conclusive reasons for compatible actions. And one can see that this is a natural exten-
sion of the view he puts forward in the book. 
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2. Against Scanlon’s Theory of Strength 
 
Despite Scanlon’s optimism, this strategy is bound to fail. There will be many 
cases in which there are clear facts about the relative strengths of two reasons 
p and q, but it is impossible for p and q both to obtain in the same counter-
factual scenario. Here is just one example. If I break my leg, I have a reason 
to get to a hospital immediately. If I step on a land mine and both of my legs 
are blown off, I have a reason to get to a hospital immediately. But I could 
not possibly be in a scenario in which I both have a broken leg and have no 
legs. If Scanlon’s theory of strength is true, then there should be no fact of 
the matter about which of my reasons is stronger: my reason to get to the 
hospital when my I break my leg or my reason to get to the hospital when 
my legs are blown off.3 But, intuitively, there is a fact of the matter about 
which reason is stronger. I have (much) stronger reason to get to the hospital 
after I step on the land mine. 
Scanlon might suggest that, in order to compare the strengths of reasons 
for compatible actions, we need not consider a single counterfactual scenario 
in which both reasons obtain. Rather, we could imagine two separate scenar-
ios where one reason to Φ obtains in one world and the other reason to Φ 
obtains in the other world. We can then ask whether each reason is sufficient 
to Φ in their respective worlds. If one reason is sufficient to Φ and the oth-
er is not, then the former reason is stronger than the latter. For example, 
consider the question, “Which is stronger, my reason to get to a hospital af-
ter I break my leg or my reason to get to a hospital after my legs are blown 
off?” As I have argued, we cannot consider a single counterfactual scenario 
in which both reasons obtain – no such scenario is possible. But we can im-
agine two distinct, but very similar, scenarios: one in which I break my leg, 
and another in which my legs are blown off. And we can suppose further 
that, in each scenario, my mother is in desperate need of my help. She is in 
such need that my reason to get to a hospital immediately when I break my 
leg is not sufficient for me to get to a hospital immediately, but my reason to 
get to a hospital immediately when my legs are blown off is still sufficient to 
get to a hospital immediately. Scanlon could then appeal to the truth of these 
counterfactuals in order to explain why my reason to get to a hospital when I 
step on a land mine is stronger than my reason to get to a hospital when my 
leg is broken, even though it is impossible for both reasons to obtain in a 
single scenario.4 
But this strategy will succeed only if the following principle is true: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Or perhaps Scanlon’s view entails only that my reasons in each case are equally strong. Ei-
ther way, such a result is problematic for Scanlon’s theory of strength, since it seems clear 
that my reason to get to a hospital is much stronger when my legs are blown off than when 
my leg is broken. 
4 Scanlon suggested precisely this reply to me in conversation. 
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For any action a, and any two reasons to a, p and q, such that it is impossible for p 
and q to obtain in the same circumstances, p outweighs q if the following hold: R(p, 
x, c, a), R(q, x, c’, a) and there is some counterfactual circumstance c in which SR(p, 
x, c, a) but, in another counterfactual circumstance c’ as normatively similar as pos-
sible to c, it is not the case that SR(q, x, c’, a). 
 
In other words, the principle Scanlon is relying on says that, if it is impossible 
for two reasons r and r’ to obtain in the same scenario, then if there is some 
scenario in which r is a sufficient reason to a but, in a scenario as normatively 
similar as possible, r’ is not a sufficient reason to a, then r is stronger than r’. 
Unfortunately for Scanlon, this principle is false. It generates contradictions. 
We have seen that, if the principle above is true, then my reason to get 
to a hospital when my legs are blown off is stronger than my reason to get to 
a hospital when I break my leg. That is because there is a counterfactual sce-
nario in which my reason to get to a hospital when my legs are blown off is a 
sufficient reason to get to a hospital even though my mother needs help, but 
in the normatively similar situation in which I break my leg, I do not have a 
sufficient reason to get to a hospital immediately. We can, however, imagine 
two scenarios that are normatively very similar to one another in which the 
opposite is true. We could compare two scenarios – one in which I have a bro-
ken leg, one in which my legs are blown off – in which a mob of people on 
every road to every hospital is killing anyone who does not have two legs.5 In 
this set of counterfactual scenarios, the fact that I have a broken leg is a suf-
ficient reason to get to a hospital, but the fact that my legs have been blown 
off is not. The verdict, then, on Scanlon’s proposed strategy, will be that my 
reason to get to a hospital when my leg is broken is stronger than my reason 
to get to a hospital when my legs are blown off. If that is so, then we have a 
contradiction. The principle above, which Scanlon is relying on to defend his 
theory of strength, entails that my reason to get to a hospital when I have a 
broken leg is both stronger and not stronger than my reason to get to a hospital 
when my legs are blown off. That is because there is a scenario in which, ac-
cording to the principle above, each reason is stronger than the other. So the 
principle above must be false. But if the principle above is false, then 
Scanlon’s strategy for making strength comparisons between reasons that 
cannot obtain in the same scenario is doomed. 
If what I have argued is correct, then there are facts about the relative 
strengths of my reasons to get to a hospital after I have sustained different 
injuries, but those facts are not determined by facts about counterfactual sce-
narios. And, if the facts about the relative weights of my reasons to get to a 
hospital are not determined by counterfactual scenarios, then there is good 
reason to think that the facts about the relative strengths of my reasons in 
situations with a similar structure – situations in which the reasons whose 
strengths are being compared could not possibly obtain in a single scenario – 
are not determined by counterfactuals either. And, if my reasons in the range 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In these scenarios, my mother is not in need of assistance. 
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of situations with that structure are not determined by facts about counter-
factuals, then there is good reason to think that the relative strengths of rea-
sons are never determined by counterfactuals. Otherwise, Scanlon would need 
to endorse a bizarre hybrid (or disjunctive) theory of strength: a theory ac-
cording to which, in situations in which it is possible for the reasons being 
compared to obtain in the same scenario, the strengths of reasons are deter-
mined by counterfactuals and, when the reasons being compared cannot ob-
tain in the same scenario, an entirely different theory of strength applies. But 
we should adopt this bizarre hybrid theory of strength only if all of the alter-
native theories of strength offering a unified (not disjunctive) account of 
strength (e.g., proportionalism, Schroeder’s higher-order theory, the value-
based theory) fail terribly.6 And we do not yet have reason to think that all of 
the other unified theories of strength fail in that way. Thus, we have good 
reason to conclude that the strengths of reasons must be determined, not by 
facts about counterfactuals, but by some other facts (e.g., facts about the rela-
tive strengths of agents’ desires, facts about the relative values of certain 
states of affairs). 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that any adequate theory of reasons and their strengths needs 
to be able to account for the relative strengths of reasons for different, but 
compatible, actions. Scanlon agrees and his proposal for accounting for these 
strength comparisons is to consider counterfactuals of various kinds. But this 
proposal has deep problems that are not easily remedied. There are many 
reasons that obviously have strengths relative to one another that could not 
possibly obtain in the same counterfactual scenario. If, in order to account 
for these strength comparisons, Scanlon tries to appeal to different but nor-
matively similar counterfactual scenarios, then he will have to rely on a prin-
ciple that generates contradictions. Perhaps Scanlon could adopt a hybrid 
theory of strength. But this hybrid theory would take a bizarre, ad hoc form. 
We should, therefore, look elsewhere for a theory of the strength of practical 
reasons.7 
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6 For defenses of these alternative unified theories of weight, see Manne (forthcoming), 
Schroeder (2007) and Maguire (unpublished). 
7 I am grateful to the following people for helpful discussion about the ideas in this paper: 
Greg Nirshberg, David O’Brien, T. M. Scanlon, Russ Shafer-Landau, Shanna Slank and Mike 
Titelbaum. I owe special thanks to Alex Hyun for his critical and insightful comments on 
previous drafts of this paper. 
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